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1 Introduction
The recent collusion theory literature has developed a clear consensus that greater asymmetries
undermine the sustainability of collusion. For example, this result is robust to whether asym-
metries are in terms of firms’ capacity constraints (see Compte et al., 2002; Vasconcelos, 2005;
and Bos and Harrington, 2010) or the number of differentiated products that each firm sells (see
Ku¨hn, 2004). These advances have been particularly important for merger policy as they have
highlighted which types of mergers can increase the likelihood of tacit collusion. In particular,
with respect to capacity constraints, Compte et al. (2002) show that collusion is more difficult
as the capacity of the largest firm is increased through a merger, and Vasconcelos (2005) finds
that collusion is hindered when the largest firm has more capacity and when the smallest firm
has less. Bos and Harrington (2010) show that increasing the capacity of medium-sized firms can
facilitate collusion, when the collusive agreement does not encompass all firms in the market.
All of these papers analyse collusion under perfect observability where firms can directly
observe their rivals’ actions, so that they can immediately detect when a rival has deviated
from the collusive agreement. In contrast, many mergers occur in markets in which there is
imperfect observability, because there is the potential for secret price cuts. This may be the
case, for example, in upstream business-to-business markets where transaction prices can be
unrelated to posted prices. Consequently, it is inappropriate to consider the competitive effects
of such mergers in terms of collusion under perfect observability and the effects should instead be
considered in the context of collusion under imperfect monitoring (see Green and Porter, 1984;
Harrington and Skrzypacz, 2007 and 2011). However, while the models in this literature provide
many interesting insights into the sustainability of collusion, it is difficult to draw implications
for merger policy from them, because they analyse collusion with symmetric firms.
In this paper, we begin to fill this gap in the literature by exploring the effects of asymmetries
in capacity constraints on collusion under imperfect observability. We achieve this by extending
Compte et al. (2002) to a setting where there is demand uncertainty and where firms never
directly observe their rivals’ prices and sales. Thus, similar to the imperfect monitoring setting
first discussed by Stigler (1964), each firm must monitor the collusive agreement using their
own privately observed sales and prices, and in this regard our model is related to Tirole’s
(1988, p.262-264) model of private monitoring that captures the results of Green and Porter
(1984) in a Bertrand framework. Similar to Tirole (1988), firms may need to solve a non-trivial
signal extraction problem in our model, which means that, in contrast to Compte et al. (2002),
2
punishment phases can occur on the equilibrium path. Using this model, we consider whether
collusion is facilitated or hindered as a given amount of capacity is reallocated among the firms.
We find, consistent with Compte et al. (2002), that collusion is hindered as the size of the largest
firm is increased. Yet, unlike Compte et al. (2002) but similar to Vasconcelos (2005), collusion
is facilitated when the capacity of the smallest firm is increased.
Our results are closest to Compte et al. (2002) when private monitoring is perfect in the
sense that all firms can detect any deviation with certainty from their privately observed sales
and prices. In this case, punishment phases do not occur on the equilibrium path and the
size of the largest firm’s capacity affects the critical discount factor in the same manner that it
does for Compte et al. (2002). However, we demonstrate that this only occurs for sufficiently
small fluctuations in market demand and that the critical level is determined by the size of the
capacity of the smallest firm. The reason is that there is perfect private monitoring if each firm’s
set of collusive sales and its set of sales when at least one of its rivals has deviated are mutually
exclusive. This is less likely to be true when the capacity of the smallest firm is reduced, holding
total capacity constant, because the smallest firm can now supply less of the market demand
when it undercuts the collusive price than before, which means its rivals’ resultant maximum
possible sales will be closer to their minimum possible collusive sales.
When market demand fluctuates to the extent that private monitoring is imperfect in the
sense that firms cannot detect a deviation with certainty, we restrict our attention to a strategy
profile in which firms can coordinate whether they behave collusively or noncollusively in each
period. Thus, similar to Tirole (1988), firms enter a punishment phase in which they play the
static Nash equilibrium for a known number of periods, when at least one firm receives collusive
sales in the preceding period that are consistent with a deviation.1 Given such a strategy profile,
we find that the critical discount factor is strictly increasing in the capacity of the largest firm and
is strictly decreasing in the capacity of the smallest firm. Moreover, we also find that the capacity
allocation affects the average price associated with the best collusive equilibrium because, unlike
in the models of collusion under perfect observability, it determines the frequency and the optimal
1While we use trigger strategies as opposed to penal codes (see Abreu et al., 1986) in the main analysis, we
show in the robustness section that our main results when the length of the punishment phase is determined
optimally are equivalent to optimal symmetric penal codes, where the punishment phase may last for one period
and firms set a low common price that is determined optimally. The reason is that, although the punishment can
be shorter for this alternative strategy, the per-period punishment will be harsher to the extent that the critical
discount factor and the best collusive profits are the same. Our approach allows us to highlight the fact that
these two strategies generate the same results.
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length of punishment phases on the equilibrium path. Specifically, we demonstrate that the best
average price is strictly increasing in the capacity of the smallest firm but is independent of
the capacity of the largest firm. The intuition for why the size of the smallest firm’s capacity
affects the critical discount factor and the best average price is due to the fact that punishment
phases occur less often when it has more capacity, because the larger firms’ sales are less likely
to be consistent with a deviation by the smallest firm. In contrast, the size of the largest firm is
unimportant for the best average price because, although the static Nash equilibrium profits are
strictly increasing in the size of the largest firm, which raises profits on the equilibrium path, it
also weakens the punishment, so the length of the punishment phase increases to such an extent
that it ensures that the effect on the (optimal) punishment is neutral.
After solving the model, we then use it to draw implications for merger policy. In particular,
we analyse both the unilateral and coordinated effects of mergers in a unified framework. Uni-
lateral effects arise if the merged entity is likely to have an individual incentive to raise prices
post-merger, whereas coordinated effects arise if the merger results in an increased likelihood and
sustainability of tacit collusion (see Ivaldi et al., 2003a and 2003b). It is well understood that
the former are associated with asymmetric post-merger market structures and the latter with
symmetric post-merger market structures. Previously, it has been only possible to study these
effects independently of each other. For example, in the framework of Compte et al. (2002),
either the monopoly price is sustainable, in which case only coordinated effects matter, or collu-
sion is not sustainable at any price, in which case only unilateral effects matter. In contrast, our
model allows for a more continuous treatment of such effects, because play alternates between
phases of collusion and competition on the equilibrium path.
The conventional wisdom is that coordinated effects are more harmful to welfare than unilat-
eral effects, because the fear is that firms will share the monopoly profit in every future period if
collusion is sustainable (for example, see Compte et al., 2002). This logic, based upon collusion
under perfect observability, also implies that a merger which disrupts collusion, by enhancing
the market power of a single firm, may actually increase consumer surplus post-merger because,
as described by Ro¨ller and Mano (2006, p.22): “it is preferable that any coordination is by
only a subset of firms (i.e. the merging parties) rather than all firms (tacitly).” However, we
show, as conjectured by Ku¨hn (2001) and Motta et al. (2003), that this logic does not always
hold under imperfect monitoring. The reason is that collusion may not enable the firms to
share the monopoly profit between them in every future period, because punishment phases can
occur on the equilibrium path. Consequently, a merger that facilitates collusion by allocating
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capacity symmetrically would be less harmful to welfare than one that creates a near monopoly.
We demonstrate that a collusive symmetric outcome will have lower prices on average than a
noncollusive asymmetric outcome, when fluctuations in demand are sufficiently large.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses how our paper relates to
other models of collusion under imperfect monitoring. Section 3 sets out the assumptions of
the model and solves for the static Nash equilibrium. In section 4, we first show that private
monitoring is perfect when demand fluctuates to a small extent and we demonstrate how the
capacity distribution affects firms’ ability to monitor the collusive agreement perfectly. We then
analyse larger fluctuations in market demand for which there is imperfect private monitoring
and find the conditions for which collusion is sustainable, given that firms’ strategies allow them
to coordinate when they should behave collusively and noncollusively. Then we consider how
the capacity allocation affects the critical discount factor and the best average price, drawing
implications for mergers. In section 5, we analyse an example to compare the unilateral and
coordinated effects of mergers on consumer surplus. Section 6 explores the robustness of our
results, and section 7 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Related Literature
Imperfect monitoring was first discussed by Stigler (1964) in a collusive setting, similar to ours,
in which each firm’s prices and sales are private information. In contrast, more recent applied
game theoretic models of imperfect monitoring have tended to have a public signal that ensures
that firms can coordinate whether they behave collusively or noncollusively in each period, for
any history. The benefit of such settings is that the public signals ensure that the analysis is
relatively simple, because equilibrium strategies have a recursive structure. For example, in the
classic framework developed by Green and Porter (1984), there are fluctuations in unobservable
market demand over time and firms compete in quantities, where each firm’s sales are private
information but the resulting market price is publically observable. Consequently, when the
market price is low, firms are unsure whether this is due to low demand or that a rival deviated.
Thus, firms condition their play on the level of the market price, entering a punishment phase
whenever price is below some trigger level. Similarly, in other papers in which price is the
strategic variable and firm demand is stochastic, prices are not publically observable but play
can be conditioned on sales because either each firm’s sales are assumed to be public information
(see Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn, 2004; and Harrington and Skrzypacz, 2007) or firms can provide
5
a credible signal of the size of their sales to their rivals (see Harrington and Skrzypacz, 2011).
While there is no such directly observable public signal in our model, we restrict attention to
a strategy profile where firms can coordinate whether they should behave collusively or noncol-
lusively in each period. This aspect of coordination is similar to Tirole’s (1988) model of private
monitoring, in which there are two symmetric firms selling a homogeneous product, without
capacity constraints, and where there is a chance that market demand is either high or low (see
also Campbell et al., 2005). Under these assumptions, there is imperfect monitoring when de-
mand in the low state is zero, because a firm cannot be sure that making no sales is due to low
demand or due to a deviation by its rival. Nevertheless, firms can sustain collusion by competing
for a known number of periods, when at least one firm receives collusive sales in the preceding
period that are consistent with a rival deviating from the strategy, and by colluding in any period
otherwise. This strategy implies that firms should enter a punishment phase whenever at least
one firm makes zero sales, and this coordinates behaviour because this information is always
common knowledge. For instance, if a firm makes zero sales because market demand is zero, its
rival will also make zero sales, regardless of the prices chosen. In contrast, if a firm makes zero
sales because its rival deviated and demand is high, then the deviant makes twice the sales it
would have had it set the collusive price, and from this information it can infer that its rival
made no sales.
To get a basic understanding of how our model compares with Tirole (1988), consider adding
symmetric capacity constraints to firms in the setting above and suppose that they can always
supply the market demand collectively but never individually. The first feature to notice is that
we do not require the unrealistic assumption that market demand is zero in some periods to
generate imperfect monitoring. This is because a firm will supply the residual demand in the
event of a deviation by its rival (i.e. market demand minus the deviant’s capacity). Thus, there
is imperfect private monitoring when each firm’s collusive sales in the low demand state are the
same as the residual demand of the high state. Moreover, when firms follow the same strategy
as above, a punishment phase is triggered whenever at least one firm’s collusive sales in the
preceding period are less than or equal to the residual demand in a high demand state. Again,
this is common knowledge because if a firm’s sales equal the residual demand in the high state
due only to low market demand, its rival will also make low sales. Yet, if a firm makes such sales
because its rival deviated and demand is high, then the deviant sells its capacity, and from this
information it can infer that its rival made low sales. The difference here is that if a firm’s sales
equal the residual demand in the low state, it will know for sure that its rival deviated, because
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such sales are only consistent with a deviation. However, to ensure coordination, such deviations
(that will not occur on the equilibrium path) cannot be punished differently because, while
the deviant can infer that its rival will receive sales that are low enough to trigger a punishment
phase, it has no way of telling how low its rival’s sales are, since it supplies its capacity regardless
of the level of demand.2
As well as being consistent with Tirole (1988), this feature that firms condition their play
on information that is common knowledge, rather than acting upon their private information, is
also consistent with the concept of public strategies, which are used by the models of imperfect
public monitoring discussed above.3 Furthermore, we show that the information that at least
one firm’s sales are consistent with a deviation is always common knowledge, even if play is off
the equilibrium path. Thus, consistent with one of the two necessary conditions for a strategy
profile to be perfect public equilibrium (PPE) (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1994, p.188), we can
check, for any date and any such common knowledge history, whether our strategies yield a
Nash equilibrium from that date on. Our equilibrium stratgies are not PPE strategies, however,
because they do not satisfy the other necessary condition: that each firm’s strategy is a public
strategy, in which firms ignore their private information in choosing their actions. Instead,
firms use their private information to infer the information that is common knowledge in our
equilibrium strategies, so they are not technically public strategies.4
Finally, focusing on a strategy profile in which firms can coordinate whether they behave
collusively or noncollusively in all periods allows us to avoid the challenges that face other models
2Another paper that is related to ours is Marshall and Marx (2008), who consider the incentives to communicate
for unconstrained and symmetric firms, when each firm’s prices and sales are private information. In their setting
without communication, they assume that any deviation is perfectly detected by all firms so that, similar to
our model, they can coordinate whether they behave collusively or noncollusively in each period. However, our
approach differs to theirs because the condition that allows the (possibly asymmetric) firms to coordinate is
determined endogenously in our model.
3A strategy σi is a public strategy if σti
(
ht, zti
)
= σti
(
ht, z˜ti
)
for all periods t, public histories ht, and private
histories zti and z˜
t
i (See Fudenberg and Tirole, 1994, p.187).
4Put differently, if there were a mechanism that made publically available the information of whether at least
one firm’s sales are consistent with a deviation, such as a trade association that verified each firm’s sales and
announced this information, then our equilibrium strategies would indeed be PPE strategies, because firms then
could condition their play on the public signal and ignore their private information. Of course, such a mechanism
would actually be superfluous because the information provided by the trade association could already be inferred
by each firm from its private information (and even if such a mechanism existed, the firms would want it to provide
better information to eliminate the non-trivial signal extraction problem, removing the need for punishment phases
on the equilibrium path).
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of collusion under private monitoring (for example, see Fudenberg and Levine, 1991; Mailath and
Morris, 2002). In such models, players cannot always coordinate their behaviour, so a player
may enter the punishment phase unsure of whether a rival will do so as well. These models are
more complicated than when coordination is possible, because they tend not to have a recursive
structure. While future research should address whether firms have incentives to follow strategies
that coordinate their play or not, it seems to us that analysing the situation where firms can
coordinate their behaviour is the most sensible place to start to analyse imperfect monitoring
and asymmetries in our applied oligopoly setting.
3 The Model
3.1 Basic assumptions
Consider a market in which a fixed number of n ≥ 2 capacity-constrained firms compete on price
to supply a homogeneous product over an infinite number of periods. Firms’ costs are normalised
to zero and they have a common discount factor, δ ∈ (0, 1). In any period t, firms set prices
simultaneously where pt = {pit,p−it} is the vector of prices set in period t, pit is the price of firm
i = {1, . . . , n} and p−it is the vector of prices of all of firm i’s rivals. Market demand consists
of a mass of mt buyers, each of whom are willing to buy one unit provided the price, without
loss of generality, does not exceed 1. We assume that firms are uncertain of the level of market
demand but they know that mt is independently drawn from a distribution G(m), with mean m̂
and density g(m) > 0 on the interval [m,m].5
Buyers are informed of prices, so they will want to buy from the cheapest firm. However,
the maximum that firm i can supply in any period is ki, where without loss of generality let
kn ≥ kn−1 ≥ ....... ≥ k1 > 0. We denote total capacity as K ≡
∑
i ki and the maximum
that firm i’s rivals can supply in each period as K−i ≡
∑
j 6=i kj . In contrast to the buyers,
firm i never observes firm j’s prices, pjτ , or sales, sjτ , j 6= i, for all τ ∈ {0, . . . , t − 1}. This
implies that each firm’s past prices and sales are its private information in period t, denoted
zti ≡ {pi0, si0; . . . ; pit−1, sit−1}. Thus, similar to Tirole (1988), our setting has the feature that
all buyers are fully aware of prices, yet all firms are only aware of their own prices. Such a setting
is consistent with a market in which all buyers are willing to check the prices of every firm in
each period to find discounts from posted prices, but actual transaction prices are never public
5We consider the implications of downward-sloping demand in section 6.
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information.6
3.2 Demand rationing and sales
Following the other papers in the literature (for example, Vasconcelos, 2005; and Bos and Har-
rington, 2010), we assume that demand is allocated using the proportional rationing rule, which
can be described as follows:
The proportional rationing rule
• Demand is allocated to the firm with the lowest price first. If this firm’s capacity is
exhausted, demand is then allocated to the firm with the second lowest price, and so on.
• If two or more firms set the same price and if their joint capacity is sufficient to supply the
remaining buyers, then the (residual) demand is allocated proportionally to capacity.
To ensure that firm i’s sales in period t, sit(pit,p−it;mt), are positive for all i and mt, even
when it is the highest-priced firm, we place the following plausible yet potentially restrictive
assumption on the capacity allocation:
Assumption 1. m ≥ K−1
For a given level of m, Assumption 1 is not restrictive with respect to the size of the smallest
firm’s capacity if all firms can only ever collectively supply as much as the minimum market
demand, m ≥ K. Otherwise, there is a restriction on the size of the smallest firm in that it
cannot be too small, but this is less restrictive the closer m is to K. The smallest firm’s capacity
can be no larger than for a symmetric duopoly, so a necessary (but not sufficient) condition to
satisfy Assumption 1 is m ≥ K2 . We place no restriction on the level of the maximum market
demand, m.
Denoting Ω(pi) as the set of firms that price below pi and p
max
−it = max{p−it}, the proportional
demand rationing rule and Assumption 1 imply that firm i’s sales in period t are:
sit(pit,p−it;mt) =

ki if pi < p
max
−it
min
{
ki
K−
∑
j∈Ω(pi)
kj
(
mt −
∑
j∈Ω(pi)
kj
)
, ki
}
> 0 if pi ≥ p
max
−it
(1)
6As we discuss further in section 6, our main results simply require that enough buyers are informed of prices
to remain robust.
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It follows from the above that firm i’s per-period profit is πit = pitsit(pit,p−it;mt), where we
write sit(pt;mt) when pit = pt for all i and we drop time subscripts when there is no ambiguity.
Notice that firm i’s per-period profit is strictly increasing in m, when it does not supply its full
capacity, and that in expectation πi = p
ki
K m̂ for any p ≤ 1 for all i, so such profits are maximised
for pm ≡ 1.
3.3 Static Nash equilibrium
In this subsection, we derive the static Nash equilibrium that can be in pure strategies or mixed
strategies. While the proof of the former is trivial, we extend the equilibrium analysis in Fonseca
and Normann (2008) to our setting of demand uncertainty to solve for the latter. The mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium also converges to the equilibrium analysis of Gal-Or (1984) when firms’
capacity constraints are symmetric.
Lemma 1. For any given n ≥ 2 and m ≥ K−1, there exists:
i) a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium, such that πNi = ki for all i, if m ≥ K,
ii) a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, such that:
πNi =

ki
kn
(´K
m
(m−K−n) g(m)dm+ kn
´m
K
g(m)dm
)
if m < K < m
ki
kn
(m̂−K−n) if m ≤ K,
(2)
for all i.
Competition is not effective when the minimum market demand is above total capacity, m ≥ K,
so firms set pi = 1 and receive π
N
i = ki for all i. In contrast, when market demand can be below
total capacity, firms are not guaranteed to supply their full capacity for every level of demand,
so they have incentives to undercut each other. However, by charging pn = 1, the largest firm
can ensure that its expected per-period profit is at least:
πn ≡

´ K
m
(m−K−n) g(m)dm+ kn
´m
K
g(m)dm if m < K < m
m̂−K−n if m ≤ K.
The intuition is that the largest firm with strictly the highest price expects to supply its full
capacity when the market demand exceeds total capacity, but it expects to supply the residual
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demand otherwise. It follows from this that the largest firm will never set a price below p ≡ πn/kn
in an attempt to be the lowest-priced firm. This implies that the smaller firms i < n can sell their
full capacity with certainty by charging a price slightly below p to obtain a profit of kiπn/kn.
Consequently, there exists a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium where πNi =
ki
kn
πn > 0 for all
i. This is equivalent to (2) and Assumption 1 is sufficient to ensure that it is positive. The
lower bound of the support of the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is p. We provide a complete
characterisation of the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in the proof of Lemma 1.
4 Collusion under Private Monitoring
In this section, we first find the conditions for which firms can monitor a collusive agreement
perfectly in that any deviation will be detected with certainty by all firms from their private
information. Then we consider the case of imperfect monitoring in which there is some uncer-
tainty over whether there has been a deviation. We henceforth focus on the case where m < K,
as collusion is unnecessary otherwise.
4.1 Perfect private monitoring
We wish to find the conditions for which all firms can perfectly monitor an agreement to sustain
a collusive price pc, given their private information, zti . Given that firms can be asymmetric,
the inferences that each firm can draw about their rivals’ actions may differ. However, under
certain conditions, all firms will be able to infer with certainty when any rival has not set pc in
period t−1, for any level of demand. This information then ensures that firms can follow trigger
strategies, where they set pc until they detect that all firms have not set the same price, in which
case they play the static Nash equilibrium forever.7 Following the standard terminology, we refer
to this as perfect private monitoring.
To begin, suppose firm i set pc ≤ 1. From (1), firm i will be able to detect with certainty
from its resultant sales when at least one rival has not set pc if:
ki
K −
∑
j∈Ω(pc) kj
(
m−
∑
j∈Ω(pc) kj
)
<
ki
K
m ≤
ki
K
m < ki, ∀ j 6= i (3)
where Ω(pc) is nonempty in (3). The reason is that firm i’s set of collusive sales,
[
ki
Km,
ki
Km
]
,
and the sales it can receive if at least one rival does not charge pc are mutually exclusive. It
7As we discuss further below, trigger strategies generate the lowest critical discount factor given the propor-
tional demand rationing rule.
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follows from the left-hand side of (3) that the inferences that a firm can draw depend upon the
size of its smallest rival’s capacity. This is due to the fact that if it is possible for a firm to infer
with certainty that its smallest rival has not set a lower price than pc, then it follows that other
larger rivals (or any set of rivals) have also not done so. Consequently, the larger firms i > 1
each have the same ability to infer whether all rivals set pc, yet it is easier for firm 1 to infer
whether all of its rivals set pc compared with any other firm, if firm 1 is strictly the smallest
firm, k1 < k2. The reason is that the smallest rival of the larger firms i > 1 is firm 1, and firm
1’s smallest rival is larger than its competitiors’ smallest rival when k1 < k2. Thus, a necessary
condition for perfect private monitoring is that the largest firms can detect with certainty when
firm 1 has not set pc from their private information.
Proposition 1. For any given n ≥ 2, δ ∈ (0, 1) and m ≥ K−1, there exists a unique level
of market demand, m∗ (k1) < K, such that there is perfect private monitoring, if and only if
m ∈ [m,m∗ (k1)).
There is perfect private monitoring when fluctuations in market demand are small for two
reasons. First, the maximum market demand must be below total capacity, m < K. Otherwise,
if firm i set pc ≤ 1, it will supply its full capacity for any mt ≥ K, in which case it will be
uncertain as to whether market demand is high and all of its rivals set pc or whether market
demand is low and at least one of its rivals charged more than pc (and whether other rivals also
undercut pc). Second, the maximum market demand must be sufficiently close to the minimum,
where the critical threshold, m∗ (k1), is defined by the level ofm that solves
ki
K−1
(m− k1) =
ki
Km,
from (3). Thus, low market demand implies that each firm’s lowest collusive sales will exceed
the maximum sales that they will receive when its smallest rival undercuts pc. The critical level
m∗ (k1) is strictly below K, because the maximum sales of nondeviating firms equal their full
capacity for any mt ≥ K, which cannot be strictly lower than their minimum collusive sales.
Consequently, the necessary condition that guarantees that all firms know when any rival has
undercut pc is also a sufficient condition to ensure that they will know when any rival has set a
price above pc.
Given deviations are perfectly detected when fluctuations in market demand are sufficiently
small, it follows that the standard results of collusion under perfect observability also apply under
perfect private monitoring. In particular, the trigger strategy profile defines a subgame perfect
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Nash equilibrium for pc = pm if:
δ ≥
πdi − π
m
i
πdi − π
N
i
=
kn
K
≡ δ∗ (kn) , (4)
where πmi =
ki
K m̂ is firm i’s per-period collusive profits and π
d
i = ki is firm i’s optimal deviation
profits given pm = 1.8 This implies that all firms’ incentives to collude are the same, despite
possible asymmetries, and that increasing the capacity of the largest firm makes collusion more
difficult to sustain. The intuition is that the static Nash equilibrium profits increase with the
capacity of the largest firm, so the punishment is weaker. This is the same as the lowest critical
discount factor in Compte et al. (2002), who assume that firms follow an alternative strategy in
which their market shares remain constant during collusive and punishment phases, and it also
coincides with the lowest possible discount factor that sustains collusion given the proportional
rationing rule.9
In contrast to Compte et al. (2002), the size of the smallest firm’s capacity is also important
in our setting, because the critical level of market demand, m∗ (k1), is strictly increasing with
the capacity of the smallest firm, k1, holding total capacity constant. This is due to the fact that
if it is just possible for a firm to infer that the smallest firm has not deviated for a given level
of m, then it is also possible for the same level of m when the smallest firm has more capacity.
Thus, as k1 increases, there is perfect private monitoring for a slightly higher level of m , because
the set of collusive sales can be wider and yet still not overlap with the set of sales for which at
least one firm does not set pc. These results can be summarised in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. For any given n ≥ 2 and m ≥ K−1, the critical discount factor, δ
∗ (kn), is strictly
increasing in the capacity of the largest firm, kn, and the critical level of market demand, m
∗ (k1),
is strictly increasing in the capacity of the smallest firm, k1.
An implication of the above is that the parameter space of collusion under perfect private
monitoring is greatest when firms’ capacities are symmetric, ki = k for all i, holding total capacity
and the number of firms constant. The reason is that the critical discount factor, δ∗ (kn), is at
8It is easy to check that the critical discount factor is higher and collusive profits are lower for pc < 1.
9The reason is that, as showed by Lambson (1994), the harshest punishment that can be inflicted on the largest
firm is that it receives the stream of profits from its minimax strategy. In our setting, the per-period minimax
profit of the largest firm is equivalent to its static Nash equilibrium profits. Thus, trigger strategies generate
the harshest possible punishment for the largest firm, so strategies that punish firm n’s rivals more severely than
trigger strategies will not lower the critical discount factor below δ∗ (kn).
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its minimum, because the static Nash equilibrium profits are as low as possible, and the critical
level of market demand, m∗ (k1), is at its maximum, because private monitoring is perfect for
the widest range of demand fluctuations.
4.2 Imperfect private monitoring
We now wish to analyse collusion under private monitoring when market demand fluctuates to
the extent that m ≥ m∗ (k1). In this case, firms can only imperfectly monitor the collusive
agreement and a firm that receives low sales has to solve a non-trivial signal extraction problem:
it does not know if its low sales are due to a low realisation of market demand or due to a
deviation.
4.2.1 Trigger-sales strategies
We consider the following strategy profile in which there are “collusive phases” and “punishment
phases”. When period t is in a collusive phase, firm i sets the collusive price pc and it privately
observes its sales, which provide a signal of the prices of its rivals. The collusive phase continues
into period t+ 1, if all firms’ sales in period t are only consistent with all firms setting the same
price. Otherwise, firms enter a punishment phase which lasts T periods. Firm i plays the static
Nash equilibrium in each period of the punishment phase, regardless of its sales, and a new
collusive phase follows the T periods of punishment.10
We refer to this strategy profile as trigger-sales strategies, because each firm effectively has a
trigger level of sales, si, where a punishment phase begins if at least one firm’s sales in a collusive
period fall below its trigger level, and where the collusive phase continues otherwise. More
specifically, framing it in terms of collusive sales, firm i’s trigger level is si ≡ si
(
pc;m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
for all i, where:
m∗−1 (k1,m) ≡
K
K−1
(m− k1) ,
and where m ≥ m∗ (k1) guarantees that m
∗
−1 (k1,m) ≥ m. This follows from (3) and it has two
implications. First, if firm i’s sales are greater than si, then all firms’ sales are only consistent
with them all setting the same price. Second, if firm i’s sales do not exceed si, then at least one
firm has received sales that are at least consistent with a deviation by the smallest firm. Again,
the size of the smallest firm’s capacity determines the critical threshold, because a deviation by
10As we discuss below, the event that triggers the punishment phase is always common knowledge. Furthermore,
we also show in section 6 that this generates the same critical discount factor and collusive profits as optimal
symmetric penal codes.
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firm 1 provides the highest sales for the other (nondeviating) firms i > 1. Thus, a collusive
phase will switch to a punishment phase on the equilibrium path, despite all firms setting pc,
wheneverm ∈
[
m,m∗−1 (k1,m)
]
; otherwise, the collusive phase will continue into the next period.
Furthermore, any firm that deviates unilaterally will trigger a punishment phase with certainty.
The event that triggers the punishment phase is common knowledge for the following reasons.
If firm i’s sales do not exceed si in a collusive period due only to a low realisation of market
demand, then its rivals’ sales will also be below their trigger levels. Yet, if firm i’s sales do not
exceed si because a rival deviated, then other nondeviating rivals will also receive sales below
their trigger levels, but the deviants will supply their capacities and they can infer from this
that a punishment phase has been triggered if m < K. Moreover, if m ≥ K, it is common
knowledge that each firm’s collusive sales will always be below their trigger levels for any level of
demand. Notice that the event that triggers the punishment phase would not always be common
knowledge, if the trigger levels were below si
(
pc;m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
for all i. This is due to the fact
that, if a firm unilaterally undercuts pc, its sales provide it with no information about market
demand (or the resultant sales of its rivals) that it does not already know, since it will supply its
full capacity for any level of demand. Consequently, given such deviations would not be punished
with certainty for any trigger level below si
(
pc;m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
, the deviant would have no way of
determining whether it should be in a collusive phase or a punishment phase in the following
period.11
In fact, we now show that the event that triggers a punishment phase is common knowledge,
even when play is off the equilibrium path. To see this, consider the following history ht =
(y0, y1, . . . , yt−1) where:
yτ =
y if siτ (piτ ,p−iτ ;mτ ) > si ∀ iy otherwise (5)
for all τ = {0, 1, . . . , t− 1}. It follows from (5) that, if period t − 1 was a collusive period,
then according to trigger-sales strategies period t should be a collusive phase if yt−1 = y, but a
punishment phase should begin if yt−1 = y. Proposition 2 shows that each firm can indirectly
observe ht through its private information in period t.
11In contrast, trigger levels above si also ensure that the event that triggers the punishment phase is common
knowledge. However, we show in section 6 that they raise the critical discount factor and lower collusive profits
compared to the level analysed in the main analysis.
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Proposition 2. For any given n ≥ 2, δ ∈ (0, 1) and m ≥ K−1, h
t is common knowledge at the
beginning of period t, for all t.
An implication of Proposition 2 is that, for each date t and for any history ht, we can check
whether trigger-sales strategies yield a Nash equilibrium from that date on. We say that collusion
under imperfect private monitoring is sustainable when this is the case. Consequently, our
equilibrium strategies satisfy one of the two necessary conditions for a perfect public equilibrium
(PPE) (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1994, p.188). They are not PPE strategies, however, because
trigger-sales strategies are not public strategies since firms do not ignore their private information
in choosing their prices. Instead, the information that our equilibrium strategies are conditioned
on is common knowledge because firms use their private information to infer it.
There are two features of trigger-sales strategies that require further discussion, both of
which are concerned with when some firms can have better information than their rivals but
they do not act upon it. The first case (that does not occur on the equilibrium path) is when
a firm knows for sure that there has been a deviation, because it receives sales that are not a
member of its set of collusive sales, si < si(p
c;m) for some i. In this case, a deviant would be
unaware that its rivals know for sure that there was a deviation, because it sells its capacity
regardless of the level of demand. Consequently, it is not possible to ensure coordination and
punish such deviations differently, since this information is not common knowledge. The second
case (that does occur on the equilibrium path if k2 > k1) is when firms i > 1 receive sales
consistent only with a deviation by firm 1, but firm 1 knows that it has not deviated. Since
firm 1’s collusive sales are consistent with a rival undercutting pc for any m ≤ KK−2 (m− k2) ≡
m∗1 (k2,m), this occurs for allm ∈
(
m∗1 (k2,m) ,m
∗
−1 (k1,m)
)
wherem∗−1 (k1,m) > m
∗
1 (k2,m) for
any k2 > k1. Alternatively, we could assume that firm 1’s trigger level is s1 = s1 (p
c;m∗1 (k2,m))
and the event that triggers a punishment phase would still be common knowledge. The reason
is that firm 1 would be able to infer that its rivals will enter the punishment phase for any
m ∈
(
m∗1 (k2,m) ,m
∗
−1 (k1,m)
)
because, given it knows for sure that a deviation has not taken
place, it can infer that sjt(p
c;mt) =
kj
Kmt for all j, so it can check whether firm i > 1 makes
sales less than si = si
(
pc;m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
.
4.2.2 Equilibria in trigger-sales strategies
We wish to find when collusion under imperfect private monitoring is sustainable. It is helpful to
denote V ciH as the expected discounted profit in period t and thereafter, if period t belongs to a
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collusive phase. Similarly, denote V ciL as the expected discounted profit in period t and thereafter,
if period t is the start of a punishment phase. Since no firms will deviate in equilibrium, it
follows that G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
is the probability that a collusive phase in period t will switch to a
punishment phase in period t + 1, where G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m
∗ (k1))
)
= 0 and G (K) = 1. Thus, it is
possible to write V ciH and V
c
iL as:
V ciH = π
c
i + δ
[(
1−G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
))
V ciH +G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
ViL
]
V ciL =
∑T−1
τ=0 δ
τπNi + δ
TV ciH .
The first term on the right-hand side of V ciH is the initial per-period collusive profit and the
second term is the expected discounted profit conditional on whether a collusive phase continues
into the next period or switches to a punishment phase. In contrast, the first term on the right-
hand side of V ciL is the expected discounted profit during the punishment phase and the second
term is the expected discounted profit when a new collusive phase begins.
Solving simultaneously yields:
V ciH =
πNi
1− δ
+
πci − π
N
i
1− δ +G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
δ (1− δT )
V ciL =
πNi
1− δ
+
δT
(
πci − π
N
i
)
1− δ +G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
δ (1− δT )
.
It follows that V ciH > V
c
iL for any π
c
i > π
N
i and T > 0, in which case it is more profitable to be
in a collusive phase than at the start of a punishment phase.
Collusion under imperfect monitoring is sustainable if, for each date t and for any history ht,
trigger-sales strategies yield a Nash equilibrium from that date on. Clearly, equilibria in trigger-
sales strategies do not exist if m ≥ K, because a punishment phase follows every collusive period,
so it follows from Lemma 1 that there is always an incentive to deviate from any pc. Consequently,
we must consider the region of m∗ (k1) ≤ m < K. Since firms play the static Nash equilibrium
during each period of the punishment phase, it is clear that they have no incentive to deviate in
such periods. Thus, we only need to consider deviations during a collusive phase.
A deviation in a collusive phase results in a one period gain in profits, followed by a definite T
period punishment phase during which firms get πNi . After this, firms then return to a collusive
phase. Therefore, firm i’s expected discounted value of deviation profits is:
V diH = π
d
i +
T∑
τ=1
δτπNi + δ
T+1V ciH ,
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where πdi = p
cki if firm i marginally undercuts the collusive price, p
c. Firm i will not deviate in
a collusive phase if V ciH ≥ V
d
iH . This can be rewritten as:
(
1− δT+1
)
V ciH ≥ π
d
i +
T∑
τ=1
δτπNi . (6)
Proposition 3 provides the lowest discount factor for which collusion under imperfect private
monitoring is sustainable, which occurs when pc = pm.
Proposition 3. For any given n ≥ 2 and m ≥ K−1, there exists a unique discount factor,
δ∗ (k1, kn) ≥ δ
∗ (kn), a unique length of the punishment phase, T
∗ (k1, kn) > 0, and a unique level
of market demand, m′ (k1, kn) ∈ [m
∗ (k1) ,K), such that collusion under imperfect private mon-
itoring is sustainable for any T ≥ T ∗ (k1, kn) and m ∈ [m
∗ (k1) ,m
′ (k1, kn)), if δ ≥ δ
∗ (k1, kn).
Similar to Tirole (1988), there are three necessary conditions that must be satisfied so that
collusion under imperfect private monitoring is sustainable. The first two are standard for
theories of collusion: firms must be sufficiently patient and the length of the punishment phase
must last a sufficient number of periods. The critical length of the punishment phase is implicitly
defined by the level of T where the incentive compatibility constraint (6) holds with equality.
However, firms must also be sufficiently patient because otherwise even a punishment phase
that lasts an infinite number of periods is insufficient to outweigh the short-term benefit from
deviating. More specifically, firms are sufficiently patient if:
δ ≥ δ∗ (k1, kn) ≡
1
1−G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
) kn
K
, (7)
where T ∗ (k1, kn) <∞ for any δ > δ
∗ (k1, kn), but T
∗ (k1, kn)→∞ otherwise.
The final necessary condition is that the maximum market demand must be sufficiently
low. The intuition is that an increase in the maximum market demand relative to the capacity
of the smallest firm raises the probability that firms will enter a punishment phase following
a collusive period, G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
. This lowers the right-hand side of (6), which tightens the
incentive compatibility constraint. When G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
is too high, the incentive compatibility
constraint cannot hold for any δ and T , so the level ofm that sets (7) equal to 1 implicitly defines
the critical threshold, m′ (k1, kn). Furthermore, note that the critical discount factor, δ
∗ (k1, kn),
converges to the critical level under perfect private monitoring, δ∗ (kn), when m = m
∗ (k1), but
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it is strictly above it for any m > m∗ (k1), since δ
∗ (k1, kn) is strictly increasing in m. These
results, and the results of corrollary 1, are depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1: parameter space of collusion
4.2.3 Capacity allocation and the sustainability of collusion
We now analyse the effects of reallocating capacity among the firms on the critical discount factor
and on the critical length of the punishment phase for given demand fluctuations. In particular,
Proposition 4 considers an increase in the capacity of a given firm when total capacity is held
constant, so such an increase may require capacity to be reallocated from a rival. For example,
increasing the size of the smallest firm in a duopoly will mean that capacity of the largest firm
decreases. In general, when the capacity of firm j changes by a small amount, the capacities of
the other firms can change to the extent that ∂ki∂kj ∈ [−1, 0] for all i 6= j, where
∑
i6=j
∂ki
∂kj
= −1.
Implications for mergers are drawn below.
Proposition 4. For any given n ≥ 2, m ≥ K−1 and m ∈ [m
∗ (k1) ,m
′ (k1, kn)), raising the ca-
pacity of the smallest firm, k1, strictly decreases δ
∗ (k1, kn) and T
∗ (k1, kn), and strictly increases
m′ (k1, kn). In contrast, raising the capacity of the largest firm, kn, strictly increases δ
∗ (k1, kn)
and T ∗ (k1, kn), and strictly decreases m
′ (k1, kn).
As the size of the smallest firm’s capacity increases, the incentive compatibility constraint
slackens, because the left-hand side of (6) rises. This is due to the fact that sales of each of
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the smallest firm’s rivals are less likely to be consistent with a deviation by the smallest firm,
so firms expect to enter the punishment phase less often. This implies that collusion is easier
to support for any T -period punishment, so both δ∗ (k1, kn) and T
∗ (k1, kn) fall and m
′ (k1, kn)
rises. In contrast, increasing the capacity of the largest firm tightens the incentive compatibility
constraint, because it weakens the punishment as the static Nash equilibrium profits increase
for each firm. This tightens the incentive compatibility constraint because, although it increases
both the left- and the right-hand side of (6), it increases the latter at a faster rater than the
former, so both δ∗ (k1, kn) and T
∗ (k1, kn) rise and m
′ (k1, kn) falls. Both of these effects are
present and work in the same direct when an increase in the capacity of the smallest firm implies
a reallocation of capacity from the largest firm (and vice versa). Thus, similar to our results for
perfect private monitoring, the parameter space of collusion under imperfect private monitoring
is largest when firms’ capacities are symmetric, ki = K/n for all i.
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Figure 2: The effects of mergers on the parameter space of collusion
An implication of Proposition 4 is that a merger that only increases the size of the smallest
firm will facilitate collusion by expanding the parameter space of collusion and a merger that
only increases the size of the largest firm will destabilise collusion by reducing it. Both of these
cases are illustrated in Figure 2. The result that collusion is more difficult to support as the
capacity of the largest firm increases is consistent with Compte et al. (2002), but the effect on
collusion due to the size of the capacity of the smallest firm is not. In contrast, both results are
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consistent with the findings of Vasconcelos (2005), but the underlying incentives for his results
are very different to ours as they rely on capacities affecting marginal costs. However, as we
stress in the next section, it is inappropriate to focus only on the parameter space of collusion
in our setting, because the collusive profits under imperfect monitoring may also depend upon
the capacity allocation.
4.3 Competitive effects of mergers
In this section, we analyse the effects of mergers on prices. Our focus is on prices as opposed
to profits or welfare because they can be quickly translated into a subset of firms’ profits and
consumer surplus, where the latter is important because ensuring that mergers do not reduce
consumer surplus is commonly perceived to be the main objective of merger control (see Lyons,
2002).12 Following the terminology of Farrell and Shapiro (1990), we henceforth refer to the
firms that merge as insiders and those not involved in the merger as outsiders. We say that a
merger is privately optimal if the sum of insiders’ profits post-merger is strictly greater than the
sum of their profits pre-merger.
4.3.1 Coordinated effects of mergers
We want to understand which mergers can facilitate collusion by raising prices post-merger on
average. To do so, we focus on the average price associated with the best collusive equilibrium,
which we refer to as the best average price. We first investigate the effect of changing the capacity
allocation on the best average price. Then we draw implications for mergers below. When private
monitoring is perfect, the best average price is independent of the capacity allocation when firms
are sufficiently patient, because firms set pm in each period. Thus, we must consider when private
monitoring is imperfect. The best average price for this case can be calculated by evaluating V ciH
at T ∗ (k1, kn), so that collusive profits are maximised subject to the constraint that collusion is
sustainable, and noting that V ciH =
1
1−δ p̂
c (k1,m)
ki
K m̂, where p̂
c (k1,m) denotes the best average
price under imperfect private monitoring.13 For comparison, it is helpful to note to that the
average price of the static Nash equilibrium is p̂N (kn, m̂) ≡
K
kn
(m̂−K−n)
m̂ for all m < K.
12Total welfare is independent of the capacity allocation, because market demand is perfectly inelastic.
13Although T ∗ (k1, kn) may not be an integer, the expected length of the punishment phase could equal this
length if there were some optimally set randomisation device that varied the length of punishment phases. More-
over, the same average price can be generated from optimal symmetric penal codes where the punishment may
last for only one period, as we show in section 6.
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Proposition 5. For any given n ≥ 2, m ≥ K−1, m ∈ (m
∗ (k1) ,m
′ (k1, kn)) and δ ≥ δ
∗ (k1, kn),
the best average price p̂c (k1,m) satisfies p̂
N (kn, m̂) < p̂
c (k1,m) < p
m. It is strictly increasing
in the capacity of the smallest firm, k1, and is independent of the capacities of all other firms,
including the largest, kn.
The best average price is increasing in the size of the smallest firm’s capacity for two reasons.
First, as the capacity of the smallest firm increases, its rivals’ collusive sales are less likely to be
consistent with a deviation by the smallest firm, so profits rise on the equilibrium path because
collusive phases are less likely to switch to punishment phases than before. Second, the increase in
profits also raises the left-hand side of (6), which slackens the incentive compatibility constraint,
and as a consequence the optimal punishment length shortens. Both effects imply that firms
expect there to be more collusive periods on the equilibrium path than when the smallest firm
has less capacity, so the best average price rises.
In contrast, the best average price is independent of the size of the largest firm’s capacity,
because there are two offsetting effects that perfectly cancel each other out. The first effect is
that an increase in the capacity of the largest firm raises profits on the equilibrium path, because
the static Nash equilibrium profits of each firm are greater than before. However, it also tightens
the incentive compatibility constraint because, although it increases both the left- and the right-
hand side of (6), it increases the latter at a faster rater than the former. Consequently, the
second effect is that the length of the punishment phase has to increase to ensure that collusion
is sustainable, and this decreases profits on the equilibrium path to the extent that the size of
the largest firm has no effect on the best average price.
This implies that a merger that includes the smallest firm pre-merger as one of the insiders
is the only merger that can facilitate collusion by raising the best average price. The complete
parameter space for which such a merger raises the average price is illustrated in Figure 2(a).
This follows since p̂c (k1,m) is equal to p
m when m = m∗ (k1), it converges on p̂
N (kn, m̂) as
m→ m′ (k1, kn), and it is also between these two levels over this range. Furthermore, a merger
that raises the best average price is privately optimal and it also strictly increases the profits
of the outsiders. This is because it is possible to write the present discounted value of profits
for any set of firms µ as
∑
i∈µ
ki
K m̂
(
p̂c(k1,m)
1−δ
)
, which is only strictly higher post-merger if k1 is
increased. As a consequence, such a merger will also lower consumer surplus, since the present
discounted value of consumer surplus is m̂1−δ (1− p̂
c (k1,m)). Finally, the fact that p̂
c (k1,m)
is never a function of kn implies that it is higher, for a given m, when firms are symmetric,
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ki = K/n for all i, and when there are fewer firms in the market. For example, p̂
c (k1,m) is
highest for a symmetric duopoly, but it is lower for a symmetric triopoly and it is even lower for
an asymmetric triopoly, where k1 < K/3.
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4.3.2 Comparing coordinated effects with unilateral effects
Given collusion may not enable firms to set pm in every period, we want to understand when
a merger that destabilises collusion will lead to higher prices on average than under collusion.
So, first we compare the best average price with the static Nash equilibrium average price for
two allocations, which we denote (k1, kn) and (kα, kν) where kα and kν are the capacities of the
smallest and largest firms for an alternative allocation, respectively. Then we draw implications
for mergers below. When the alternative allocation comes from a merger, it follows that there
will be ν < n firms post-merger, where kα ≥ k1 and kν ≥ kn.
Proposition 6. For any given n ≥ 2, m ≥ K−1, m < m
′ (k1, kn) and δ ≥ δ
∗ (k1, kn), the
best average price of (k1, kn) is less than the static Nash equilibrium average price of (kα, kν),
p̂c (k1,m) < p̂
N (kν , m̂), if kν > kn and m ≥ m
′ (k1, kν), where m
′ (k1, kν) > m
∗ (k1).
The intuition is that punishment phases are expected to occur more often on the equilibrium
path as the level of m increases, because firms are more likely to receive sales that are consistent
with a deviation by the smallest firm. Thus, the best average price falls towards the average
price of the static Nash equilibrium as m increases. Yet, the average price of the static Nash
equilibrium is strictly increasing in the size of the largest firm’s capacity, so an alternative
allocation where the largest firm has more capacity will have a higher p̂N (kν , m̂) than p̂
c (k1,m)
when m is sufficiently large. Notice that, as illustrated in Figure 2(b), the maximum market
demand must be so large that collusion under imperfect monitoring will not be sustainable for
the alternative allocation, when the size of the smallest firm is unchanged, k1 = kα.
This has two implications for merger policy. First, a merger that destabilises collusion by
increasing the size of the largest firm may not actually decrease prices post-merger. In fact, our
model suggests that it is not in the insiders’ interests to propose the merger if it destabilises
14This also implies that larger firms can increase their profits by divesting capacity to the smallest firm, so that
collusion is facilitated. This is not unheard of in actual merger cases, because there are examples where insiders’
capacity or market shares fall as a result of a divestment remedy (see Compte et al., 2002; and Davies and Olczak,
2010).
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collusion and decreases average prices. This follows since such a merger is privately optimal
for any set of µ firms if
∑
i∈µ
ki
K m̂
(
p̂N (kν ,m̂)
1−δ
)
>
∑
i∈µ
ki
K m̂
(
p̂c(k1,m)
1−δ
)
, so the condition that
ensures the insiders’ profits increase post-merger also ensures that the average price rises post-
merger. Second, when presented with the possibility of two merger outcomes, where one leads to
a more asymmetric allocation than the other, it is not always the case that the most asymmetric
allocation should be preferred, even if the other allocation facilitates collusion. Instead, it is
important to consider the likelihood to which price wars will occur over time for the collusive
allocation and this should be compared against the effect of stregthening one firm’s market power
unilaterally.
5 An Example
We complement our general results by analysing an example. We do this for two reasons.
First, we wish to show that symmetric collusive capacity allocations can have substantially lower
average prices than noncollusive capacity allocations. Second, we wish to illustrate how the
unilateral and coordinated effects of mergers can be simulated in our framework. This is relevant
for a recently emerging literature that aims to extend the merger simulation methodology to
coordinated effects (Sabbatini, 2006; Hikisch, 2008; and Davis and Huse, 2010).
We consider an example in which total industry capacity is K = 100 and assume that this
is divisible into 6 equal sized parts. We suppose there is an asymmetric triopoly pre-merger, in
which firm 1 has 1/6 of this capacity, firm 2 has 2/6 and firm 3 has 3/6, and we denote this
capacity allocation as (1/6, 2/6, 3/6). We then consider three alternative merger scenarios. The
first is a merger between firms 1 and 2 that would create a symmetric duopoly, (3/6, 3/6). The
second is a merger between firm 1 and 3 that would create an asymmetric duopoly, (2/6, 4/6).
The final alternative is a merger between firms 2 and 3 that would create a very asymmetric
duopoly, (1/6, 5/6).15
We want to analyse the effects of such mergers on consumer surplus. We focus on the
expected consumer surplus per unit sold per-period of the most profitable equilibrium, CS (p̂) ≡
1 − p̂, which is simply the difference between the monopoly price and the average price, p̂.16
The preceding analysis implies that p̂ is the best average price when collusion is sustainable,
15Alternatively, (3/6, 3/6) and (2/6, 4/6) could result from a remedy of the merger between 2 and 3, in which
capacity of the merged entity is divested to firm 1.
16Multiplying CS (p̂) by m̂ gives the expected consumer surplus per-period, then dividing this by 1 − δ gives
the present discounted value of consumer surplus, assuming buyers have the same discount factor as firms.
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otherwise it is the static Nash equilibrium average price. Figure 3 plots CS (p̂) as a function
of ∆m ≡ m−mm̂ for the various scenarios under the assumption that demand is drawn from a
uniform distribution, where G(m) = m−mm−m . Parameter values are chosen such that m̂ = 92 for
all ∆m and that K−1 ≤
5
6 (100) ≤ m ≤ m ≤ K = 100. We let δ → 1 so collusion is sustainable
for all m ∈ [m,m′ (k1, kn)) .
17 Finally, the analysis above implies that each merger is privately
optimal whenever CS (p̂) is strictly lower post-merger than pre-merger.
Figure 3: G(m) = m−mm−m , m̂ = 92, K = 100 >
5
6 (100) ≥ K−1, and δ → 1
Each of the plotted lines in Figure 3 has a similar shape. For low levels of ∆m, where
m ≤ m∗ (k1), private monitoring is perfect so CS (p̂) = 1 − p
m = 0. When ∆m is in an
intermediate range, such that m∗ (k1) < m ≤ m
′ (k1, kn), private monitoring is imperfect and
CS (p̂) = 1 − p̂c (k1,m) is upward-sloping because p̂
c (k1,m) is strictly decreasing in m. For
high levels of ∆m, where m > m′ (k1, kn), CS (p̂) = 1 − p̂
N (kn, m̂) is constant since m̂ is
held fixed. Note that comparing (1/6, 2/6, 3/6) and (3/6, 3/6) in Figure 3 is consistent with
moving horizontally from left to right on Figure 2(a) for δ → 1, because only the smallest
firm’s capacity is increased post-merger. Hence, collusion under perfect and imperfect private
monitoring would be sustainable for a wider range of ∆m post-merger. Likewise, comparing (1/6,
2/6, 3/6) and (1/6, 5/6) can be thought of as moving horizontally from left to right on Figure
17For δ < 1, the only difference is that there is a discontinuity in CS (p̂) at the point where collusion under
imperfect monitoring becomes unsustainable, so the line jumps to the CS (p̂) associated with the static Nash
equilibrium for a lower level of ∆m.
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2(b) for δ → 1, because only the largest firm’s capacity is increased post-merger. Consequently,
private monitoring becomes imperfect at the same level of ∆m but collusion under imperfect
monitoring is sustainable for a (slightly) wider range pre-merger. For (2/6, 4/6), both the
capacities of the smallest and the largest firms have increased compared to (1/6, 2/6, 3/6).
Figure 3 shows that all merger scenarios lower CS (p̂) for some levels of ∆m. Of particular
interest is that it shows that a merger that creates a more asymmetric allocation (1/6, 5/6) than
pre-merger (1/6, 2/6, 3/6) can reduce consumer surplus, even if it destabilises collusion. This
occurs at approximately ∆m = 0.025 and the effect can be considerable: CS (p̂) under (1/6,
2/6, 3/6) is over four times higher than under (1/6, 5/6) for values of ∆m close to 0.025, even
though collusion is still sustainable for the former but not the latter. Furthermore, Figure 3 also
shows that, when demand fluctuations are sufficiently large, a merger that facilitates collusion
by creating a symmetric duopoly reduces consumer surplus less than a merger that creates a
more asymmetric duopoly. This occurs at around ∆m = 0.075 when collusion is sustainable for
(3/6, 3/6) but it is not for the asymmetric duopolies. Again, the difference in CS (p̂) can be
substantial: when ∆m is approximately 0.09, it is over four times higher for (3/6, 3/6) than for
(1/6, 5/6) and two times higher for (3/6, 3/6) than for (2/4, 4/6).
6 Robustness
In this section, we explore the robustness of our results. First, we show that optimal symmetric
penal codes generate the same critical discount factor and best average prices as in our main
analysis. Second, we show that higher trigger levels raise the critical discount factor and lower
the best average price. Third, we consider the implications of downward sloping demand. Finally,
we discuss and relax the assumption that each firm supplies all units at the same price.
6.1 Penal codes
In the main analysis, we assumed that firms play the static Nash equilibrium for a fixed number
of periods during any punishment phase. In many models of collusion, such strategies are inferior
to penal codes where the punishment can be harsher than the static Nash equilibrium (see Abreu
et al., 1986). However, similar to under perfect private monitoring, here we show that the critical
discount factor and the best average price under optimal symmetric penal codes are the same as
in our main analysis for imperfect private monitoring. The strategies considered in this section
are equivalent to the strategies that generate the lowest possible discount factor in Compte et
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al. (2002).
Consider the following strongly symmetric strategy profile, in which firms behave identically
after all histories. When firms are in a collusive phase in period t, firm i sets the collusive price
pc and it privately observes its sales. The collusive phase continues into period t+1, if all firms’
sales in period t are only consistent with them all setting the same price. Otherwise, the firms
enter a punishment phase in which firm i sets pp in period t + 1. If each firm’s sales in period
t+ 1 are only consistent with them all setting the same price, then a new collusive phase begins
in period t+ 2. Otherwise, the punishment phase continues into period t+ 2, and the process is
repeated until a period in which all firms’ sales are only consistent with all firms having set the
same price.18
In this case, V ciH and V
c
iL are as follows:
V ciH = π
c
i + δ
[(
1−G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
))
V ciH +G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
V ciL
]
V ciL = π
p
i + δ
[(
1−G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
))
V ciH +G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
V ciL
]
,
where the first terms on the right-hand side are the expected per-period profit of the initial
period, and the second terms are the expected discounted profit conditional on whether the next
period is in a collusive or punishment phase. Solving simultaneously yields:
V ciH =
πci − δG
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
(πci − π
p
i )
1− δ
and V ciL = π
p
i+
δ
(
πci −G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
(πci − π
p
i )
)
1− δ
.
For this strategy profile, we must consider each firm’s incentive to deviate in a collusive phase
and in a punishment phase. Firm i will not deviate in a collusive phase if V ciH ≥ π
d
i + δV
c
iL, and
it will not deviate in a punishment phase if V ciL ≥ π
dp
i + δV
c
iL, where π
dp
i denotes the per-period
profit firm i receives from its optimal deviation in a punishment phase. Substituting V ciH and
V ciL into these two incentive compatibility constraints and rearranging shows that firm i will not
deviate in a collusive phase or in a punishment phase if:
πci −
(
πdi − π
c
i
)
δ
(
1−G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)) ≥ πpi ≥ πdpi − δ (1−G (m∗−1 (k1,m)))πci1− δ (1−G (m∗−1 (k1,m))) . (8)
This implies that a necessary condition for collusion to be sustainable is:
δ ≥
1(
1−G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)) ( πdi − πci
πdi − π
dp
i
)
∀ i. (9)
Otherwise, both incentive compatibility constraints cannot hold.
18Proposition 2 ensures that the event that triggers a punishment phase is still common knowledge for any ht.
27
Since both V ciH and V
c
iL are increasing in π
p
i , the firms have an incentive to set π
p
i as high
as possible, subject to collusion being sustainable. Thus, it is optimal for πpi to equal to the
left-hand side of (8), which is the case for pc = pm if:
pp = 1−
1
δ
(
1−G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)) (K − m̂
m̂
)
. (10)
Substituting (10) into V ciH gives:
V ciH =
1
(1− δ)
p̂c (k1,m)
ki
K
m̂ where p̂c (k1,m) =
m̂−G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
K
m̂
(
1−G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)) ,
which is the same as in our main analysis (see Proposition 5). Finally, to solve for the critical
discount factor, we must find the expression for πdpi . The optimal deviation for firm i in a
punishment phase will either be to set the monopoly price and supply the residual demand,
m̂ −K−i, or to undercut p
p marginally to supply its capacity. Comparing the profits for these
two options yields:
πdpi =

ki
[
1− 1
δ(1−G(m∗−1))
(
K−m̂
m̂
)]
> 0 if δ ≥ 1
(1−G(m∗−1(k1,m)))
ki
m̂
m̂−K−i otherwise.
Substituting πdpi into (9) shows that collusion is sustainable if δ ≥
1
(1−G(m∗−1(k1,m)))
ki
K for all i.
This implies that, compared with trigger-sales strategies, optimal symmetric penal codes make
collusion easier to sustain for all firms, except the largest. Moreover, the largest firm’s incentives
to collude are the same under these two strategies, so the critical discount factor is same as for
our main analysis (see Proposition 3).19
6.2 Trigger-sales levels
Imperfect private monitoring in the main analysis is based on the assumption that firms enter
a punishment phase if at least one firm’s sales in a collusive period fall below its trigger level
si ≡ si
(
pc;m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
for all i. While this is the lowest trigger level that ensures that the
event that begins a punishment phase is common knowledge, it is not unique because higher
trigger levels would also achieve the same result. We show below that higher trigger levels
raise the critical discount factor and lower collusive profits, so firms would not have incentive to
19A secondary implication of this analysis is that our results are robust if only K−1 < m buyers are informed of
prices in each period, provided buyers are still allocated according to the proportional rationing rule. The reason
is that each firm’s incentive to deviate in a collusive phase and a punishment phase will be unaffected by the
proportion of buyers who are unaware of the secret price cut.
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implement higher than necessary trigger levels. Before doing so, we note that higher trigger sales
are also less natural candidates in the real world, because they imply that firms should enter a
punishment phase even for sales that are not consistent with a deviation.
Suppose that each firm now has a trigger level of si ≡ si (p
c;m∗) for all i, for some m∗ >
m∗−1 (k1,m), which implies that firms will enter the punishment phase more often than in the
main analysis. Since sales above si
(
pc;m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
are only consistent with collusive play by
all firms, it follows that the event that triggers the punishment phase is still common knowledge:
if a firm’s sales are below its trigger level, then so are its rivals. Following the steps in the
main analysis (or in the subsection above), it is possible to find that collusion under imperfect
monitoring in this case is sustainable if:
δ ≥
1
1−G (m∗)
kn
K
in which case p̂c (k1,m
∗) =
m̂−G (m∗)K
m̂ (1−G (m∗))
.
Notice that, in contrast to the main analysis, both are independent of the smallest firm’s capacity.
However, differentiating both with respect to m∗ shows that the critical discount factor is strictly
increasing in m∗ and that the best average price is strictly decreasing in m∗. Thus, compared
with the trigger level analysed in the main analysis, firms need to be more patient to sustain
collusion under imperfect private monitoring and profits are lower. This implies that firms have
do not have an incentive to set their trigger level above that in the main analysis.
6.3 Downward-sloping demand
Throughout the paper, we have assumed, consistent with Compte et al. (2002), that market
demand is always perfectly inelastic. While it is often considered that collusion is more likely
to occur in industries where demand is inelastic, the main reason for this assumption is that
it ensures that the model is tractable. To address this limitation, we sketch some results that
can be generated from our model when demand is downward sloping for a restricted parameter
space where the model is not completely intractable. For simplicity, we also restrict the analysis
to the equilibrium path.20 Contrary to the main analysis, we show that monitoring is easier for
a higher collusive price when demand is downward sloping, but firms do not have an incentive
to raise the price to the point where private monitoring is perfect, when this requires setting a
price above the monopoly level. The latter implies that imperfect private monitoring in the best
collusive equilibrium is not restricted to the special case of perfectly inelastic demand.
20A complete proof is available from the authors upon request.
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Let market demand in period t be denoted by D (pt;mt), where demand is downward sloping,
∂D
∂p < 0. Similar to the main analysis, let market demand shift with mt where
∂D
∂m > 0 and where,
as before, mt is independently drawn from a distribution G(m), with mean m̂ and density
g(m) > 0 on the interval [m,m]. For simplicity, assume that ∂D∂p is independent of mt. Suppose
there exists a choke price, P (mt) , for all mt ∈ [m,m], such that D (pt;mt) = 0 for any pt ≥
P (mt) and D (pt;mt) > 0 for any pt ∈ [0, P (mt)). Finally, assume that the expected industry
profit function, pD (p; m̂), is strictly concave, so there exists a unique monopoly price, pm, that
satisfies argmaxp {pD (p; m̂)}. To keep the analysis as simple as possible, we make the following
assumptions on the parameter space:
Assumption 2. K−1 ≤ D (p;m) for some p ∈ [p
m, P (m))
Assumption 3. D (0;m) < K
Assumption 2 is the downward-sloping demand equivalent to Assumption 1, as it ensures
that even the highest-priced firm will always receive positive sales, provided its price is below p.
Assumption 3 ensures that the market demand is always supplied, and this is equivalent to the
necessary condition for collusion to be sustainable under inelastic demand, m < K.
Similar to (3), each firm’s collusive sales under the proportional allocation rule and the set
of sales it can receive when at least one rival deviates are mutually exclusive if:
ki
K−1
(D (pc;m)− k1) <
ki
K
D (pc;m) ≤
ki
K
D (pc;m) < ki.
Consequently, there is perfect private monitoring if and only if mt ∈ [m,m
∗ (k1, p
c)), where
m∗ (k1, p
c) is the level of m that satisfies:
1
K−1
(D (pc;m)− k1)−
1
K
D (pc;m) = 0. (11)
Notice that ∂D∂m > 0 guarantees that m
∗ (k1, p
c) is unique, and that Assumption 3 ensures that
m∗ (k1, p
c) ∈ (m,K). Using the implicit function theorem, it is possible to check that m∗ (k1, p
c)
is strictly decreasing in the capacity of the smallest firm, k1, and strictly increasing in the collusive
price, pc. The former is consistent with the main analysis, but the latter is not. The intuition
of the latter is that raising the collusive price reduces the market demand, which makes it easier
for firms to monitor the smallest firm. This is because a deviation by the smallest firm would
now supply relatively more of the market demand, so the resultant sales of each of its rivals will
be further from their set of collusive sales.
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An implication of this is that firms may want to set the collusive price above the monopoly
level to make monitoring easier, when colluding on the monopoly price requires imperfect private
monitoring. However, this involves a tradeoff as raising the collusive price above the monopoly
level lowers the per-period collusive profits. We wish to demonstrate that firms do not have
an incentive to set their price at a level that ensures that private monitoring is perfect. Thus,
let p∗ denote the level of pc that satisfies m = m∗ (k1, p
c) and suppose that p∗ ∈ (pm, p]. This
implies that there is perfect private monitoring if firms collude on p∗, but there will be imperfect
monitoring for any collusive price below p∗, including pm. Following the steps of section 6.1, it
is possible to show that firm i’s discounted collusive profits when demand is downward sloping
are:
V ciH =
πci −G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m, p
c)
)
πdi
(1− δ)
(
1−G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m, p
c)
)) ∀ i
where m∗−1 (k1,m, p
c) is the level of mt that satisfies:
1
K−1
(D (pc;m)− k1)−
1
K
D (pc;mt) = 0. (12)
Similar to the main analysis, there is perfect private monitoring when m∗−1 (k1,m, p
c) = m, since
this implies that m∗ (k1, p
c) = m from (11). By definition, this occurs when the collusive price
is p∗, so G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m, p
∗)
)
= 0.
Consider the effect of a small change in pc on firm i’s discounted collusive profits for some
pc ∈ [pm, p∗]. Differentiating V ciH with respect to p
c (and surpressing notation slightly) yields:
∂V ciH
∂pc
=
1
(1− δ)
(
1−G
(
m∗−1
)) [∂πci
∂pc
−G
(
m∗−1
) ∂πdi
∂pc
− g
(
m∗−1
) ∂m∗−1
∂pc
(πci − (1− δ)V
c
iH)
]
.
This highlights the tradeoff that firms face when demand is downward sloping: the first two terms
in square brackets have a nonpositive effect on V ciH for any p
c ≥ pm, implying that raising the
collusive price above the monopoly level decreases the discounted collusive profits because the per-
period collusive profits are lower and the per-period deviation profits are higher; whereas the third
term has a nonnegative effect due to the fact that raising the collusive price improves monitoring,
so the discounted collusive profits increase becauseG
(
m∗−1 (k1,m, p
c)
)
falls.21 Nevertheless,
∂V ciH
∂pc
is negative when pc is evaluated at p∗ > pm, because the first term is negative for any pc > pm,
and the second and third terms are zero at p∗, since G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m, p
∗)
)
= 0. Thus, the above
implies that reducing the collusive price from p∗ raises each firm’s discounted collusive profits, so
firms do not have an incentive to eliminate imperfect monitoring completely by setting p∗ > pm,
when demand is downward sloping.
21Using the implicit function theorem on (12) yields
∂m∗−1
∂pc
= k1
K−1
(
∂D
∂pc
/ ∂D
∂m
)
< 0.
31
6.4 Customer-specific prices
Up to this point, we have assumed, consistent with Tirole (1988) and Campbell et al. (2005),
that each firm supplies all units at the same price in any given period. In contrast to this context,
it is possible in some settings that a firm could make a limited number of units available at a
low price or offer specific terms to each individual buyer. Consequently, when a firm considers
deviating from the collusive agreement, it may want to try to hide its deviation by limiting how
much is sold at the deviation price. In terms of our model, this would mean that the set of
sales that are consistent with a deviation are larger than what has been considered in the main
analysis, and that punishment phases would need to occur for a wider range of collusive sales.
In fact, if a firm can sell any amount they wish at the deviation price, then all collusive sales will
be consistent with even the smallest of deviations, and this would make collusion unsustainable.
Despite this, our results are of interest for two reasons. First, it is reasonable to expect that
there are a number of contexts in which firms are likely to sell all units at the same price in any
given period. For example, collusion is likely to be difficult to sustain if a firm’s prices are set by
a number of different sales representatives, so the pricing strategy may need to be coordinated
and organised by management at a higher level. This is especially true if the firm is looking
deviate from a collusive agreement without triggering a punishment phase. Thus, as argued by
Harrington and Skrzypacz (2007, p.318), setting different prices to different buyers will require
the managers to predict which buyers make up the market demand. This is unlikely to be feasible
if the buyers are small compared to the market demand and market demand varies over time,
as in our model. Furthermore, firms may avoid charging consumers different prices if they are
concerned that it will create incentives for arbitrage, which could ultimately undermine a firm’s
attempts to limit the units sold at the low price.22
Second, our results are robust under some conditions when firms can offer customer-specific
prices, so that a firm can restrict how much is sold at the deviation price by offering such a price to
a limited number of buyers. In this context, collusion may still be sustainable if firms have some
information on each buyer’s demand. For example, suppose that a finite number of symmetric
buyers are expected to account for an equal proportion of the market demand (and that our
other assumptions on demand in the main analysis are still satisfied). When firms can charge
customer-specific prices, they may be able to sustain the monopoly price to each consumer, if
22In a setting where arbitrage within any given period is possible, the firms could ensure that no arbitrage
occurs in equilibrium by following strategies in which they all set the same price in punishment phases as well as
in collusive phases, as described in section 6.1.
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they enter the punishment phase whenever at least one firm’s collusive sales are consistent with
a rival offering a lower price to at least one buyer. Under this strategy, the results will be the
same as in the main analysis, if the capacity of the smallest firm is less than or equal to the
lowest possible demand of each buyer. The reason is that, even though the largest firms i > 1
may only supply one buyer when they deviate, they will still supply at least as much as when the
smallest firm deviates. As a result, it remains true that if it is possible for a firm to infer that
the smallest firm has not deviated, then it follows that larger firms have also not deviated. Thus,
when each buyer accounts for a sufficiently large proportion of the market demand, the size of
the smallest firm’s capacity still determines when a punishment phase is entered, so the critical
discount factor and the best collusive profits will be the same, because each firms’ incentives are
unaffected.
In contrast, our results do not hold if the smallest firm can supply the lowest possible demand
of a buyer, but following the logic of our model implies that collusion can still be sustainable.
For instance, in this case, it will be the size of the buyers, not the size of the smallest seller, that
determines the range of collusive sales for which firms enter a punishment phase. In particular,
as the size of the smallest buyer decreases, collusion will less successful, until it is unsustainable
when the buyers are infinitesimally small.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have explored the effects of asymmetries in capacity constraints on collusion in a setting
where there is demand uncertainty and where firms never directly observe their rivals’ prices
and sales. Despite the fact that each firm must monitor the collusive agreement using their
private information, we have showed that such private monitoring perfectly detects deviations
when demand fluctuations are sufficiently small, and that the critical level is determined by the
size of the smallest firm’s capacity. Otherwise, private monitoring is imperfect and punishment
phases must occur on the equilibrium path. In either case, collusion is hindered when largest
firm has more capacity and when the smallest firm has less capacity. We also analysed both the
unilateral and coordinated effects of mergers in a unified framework. We showed, in contrast
to collusion under perfect observability, that a merger that creates a near monopoly would lead
to lower consumer surplus than one that facilitates collusion by creating a more symmetric
capacity distribution, when demand fluctuations are sufficiently large. Using an example, we
showed that a collusive symmetric duopoly could have substantially higher consumer surplus
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than more asymmetric noncollusive duopolies.
Our results have two implications for merger policy. First, although market transparency is
rightly an important criteria in assessing coordinated effects, our model reemphasises the fact
that a lack of transparency about rivals’ prices and sales is not a sufficient condition to rule out
such effects: it is also necessary to check that firms are unable to detect deviations using only
their own prices and sales. While this possibility is explicitly mentioned in the most recent US
and European horizontal merger guidelines, our model suggests that this possiblity is less likely
when the market structure is more asymmetric. Second, mergers that create symmetric market
structures and raise concerns of coordinated effects should not be presumed to be more harmful
than asymmetric market structures where collusion is not considered a problem. A collusive
agreement may require sufficiently frequent and long price wars that actually increase consumer
surplus compared to an alternative outcome where collusion will not arise. This outcome is more
likely according to our model, when market demand fluctuates to a large extent over time.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. There exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if m ≥ K, because, from (1),
si(pi,p−i;m) = ki ∀ pi ≤ 1 and m ∈ [m,m]. Consequently, the best reply of firm i is to set
pi = 1 for any p−i, so there is a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in which pi = 1 and
πNi = ki ∀ i. In contrast, there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium if m < K. To see this,
note that any pure strategy Nash equilibrium that can exist requires firms to set pj = p
max
t ∀
j, where pmaxt ≡ max {pt}. Otherwise, firm j ∈ Ω (p
max
t ) has an incentive to increase its price
towards pmaxt ∀ pj < p
max
t , since sj (pj ,p−j;m) = kj ∀ j ∈ Ω (p
max
t ). However, for any candidate
equilibrium in which pj = p ∈ (0, 1] ∀ j, firm i has an incentive to lower its price, because
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si(p− ǫ, p;m) > si(p, p;m) if m < K, where ǫ > 0 but small. Moreover, for pj = p = 0 ∀ j, firm
i has an incentive to raise its price, since Assumption 1 ensures that si(ǫ, 0;m) > 0 ∀ i.
Nevertheless, if K > m ≥ K−1, the existence of a mixed strategy is guaranteed by Thereom 1
of Dasgupta and Maksin (1986). To characterise the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, let Hi(p)
denote the probability that firm i charges a price less than or equal to p. Below we demonstrate
that the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium profits are given by (2) for all i and that:
Hi(p) =
1
ki
 (sn − pkn)
pkn (si − ki)
n∏
j=1
kj
1/(n−1) , (13)
where, if firm i is strictly the highest-priced firm, its sales are:
si ≡

´ K
m
(m−K−i) g(m)dm+ ki
´m
K
g(m)dm if m < K < m
m̂−K−i if m ≤ K.
This converges to the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in Fonseca and Normann (2008) as
m→ m.
In equilibrium, firm i must receive the following expected profit from charging p:
p
∏
j 6=i
Hj(p)si +
1−∏
j 6=i
Hj(p)
 ki
 = ki
kn
sn, ∀ i (14)
where
∏
j 6=iHj(p) is the probability that firm i is the highest-priced firm. The right-hand side
of (14) comes from the fact that firm i expects to receive profit of si if pi = 1, which implies that
firm i will have no incentive to price below si/ki ≡ pi, where pn ≥ pn−1 ≥ . . . ≥ p1. Moreover,
any firm j < n can guarantee profits of
kj
kn
sn ≥ sj by charging a price marginally below pn, so
all firms have no incentive to price below p
n
. Finally, the fact that all firms j < n place positive
probability on charging p
n
is necessary and sufficient to ensure that the lowest price that firm
n will charge is also p
n
. This implies that the lower bound of Hi(p) is p = pn = sn/kn ∀ i.
Manipulating (14) yields: ∏
j
Hj(p) =
(sn − pkn)
pkn (si − ki)
kiHi(p). (15)
It follows from (13) that:
∏
j
Hj(p) =
n∏
l=1

 (sn − pkn)
pkn (si − ki)
n∏
j=1
kj
1/(n−1) k−1l

=
 (sn − pkn)
pkn (si − ki)
n∏
j=1
kj
n/(n−1) n∏
l=1
k−1l
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=
(sn − pkn)
pkn (si − ki)
 (sn − pkn)
pkn (si − ki)
n∏
j=1
kj
1/(n−1) (16)
Substituting (16) into (15) shows that Hi(p) is as claimed in (13).
It follows from (13) that Hi(1) ⋚ 1 if
kn−1
i∏
j 6=n kj
R 1. This has two implications. First, if
kn−1
i∏
j 6=n kj
≥ 1, then firm i randomises over
[
p, 1
]
and puts mass of 1−Hi(1) on a price of 1 when
the inequality is strict. Note that
kn−1
i∏
j 6=n kj
> 1 never holds if ki = k ∀ i but always holds for
firm n if kn > k1. Second, if
kn−1
i∏
j 6=n kj
< 1 for some i < n, then firm i randomises over
[
p, pi
]
where pi < 1 solves Hi (pi) = 1. Consequently, the probability distributions of the larger firms
with higher upper bounds must be adjusted accordingly. For example, if pi < 1 only for firm
1 (which is the case for any triopoly with k1 < k2), then the largest n − 1 firms play with the
Hi(p) adjusted so that n− 1 replaces n over [p1, 1]. Note that
kn−1
i∏
j 6=n kj
< 1 never holds if n = 2
or if ki = k ∀ i for any n ≥ 2. 
Proof of Proposition 1. There is perfect private monitoring if firm i, ∀ i, can detect with certainty
whether pjt−1 = pt−1 ∀ j from its private information, zit. Since only pit−1 and sit−1 provide
information about pjt−1, j 6= i, we must find the levels of m for which firm i’s set of sales when
pjt−1 = p ∀ j and the sales it would receive if pjt−1 6= p for some j are mutually exclusive, ∀ i.
To begin, suppose for the moment that firm i set p ≤ 1 and that si < ki. Thus, it follows
from (1) that it knows that no firm priced higher than it, p = pmax. With this information, from
(3) it can infer with certainty whether pj = p ∀ j if:
ki
K
m >
ki
K −
∑
j∈Ω(p) kj
(
m−
∑
j∈Ω(p) kj
)
, ∀ j 6= i (17)
where Ω(p) is nonempty in (17). Since the right-hand side of (17) is decreasing in
∑
j∈Ω(p) kj , it
follows that firm i, ∀ i, can infer with certainty, ∀ m ∈ [m,m], that no rival (or any set of rivals)
charged pj < p, for some j, if
ki
Km >
ki
K−1
(m− k1), where rearranging yields:
m <
k1
K
(K −m) +m ≡ m∗ (k1) .
It follows from the above thatm∗ (k1) is uniquely defined by its parameters and thatm
∗ (k1) < K.
An implication of the latter is that m < m∗ (k1) is a necessary and sufficient condition for firm
i, ∀ i, to detect with certainty whether pj = p ∀ j, because it can also infer with certainty that
at least one rival has not set a higher price for all m < K. This is because sit−1(p;mt−1) < ki
∀ mt−1 < K, yet it receives sales of sit−1 = ki if p < p
max
t−1 . Thus, it follows from the above that
there is perfect private monitoring, if and only if m ∈ [m,m∗ (k1)). 
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Proof of Proposition 2. To prove that ht is common knowledge despite it not being directly
observable, we show that: (a) firm i, ∀ i, can infer ht in period t given its private information,
zti ; and that (b) firm i, ∀ i, can infer that firm j, ∀ j 6= i, can infer h
t in period t given firm j’s
private information, ztj. It then easily follows that firm i can infer that firm j can infer that firm
i can infer ht, and so on. Since only piτ and siτ provide information about yτ and denoting yjτ
as firm j’s private signal of yτ , it suffices to check that firm i, ∀ i, can infer that yjτ = yτ ∀ j,
for any given piτ and siτ . It follows from (1) that there are two possibilities that we must check:
(i) siτ = ki, and (ii) siτ < ki.
First, suppose that firm i sets piτ and that siτ = ki. If ki ≤ si, then it can infer from its
sales that sjτ = kj ≤ sj ∀ j. Otherwise, if ki > si, then from (1) it can infer from its sales that
firm j 6= i’s sales are:
sjτ (piτ ,p−iτ ;mτ )

= kj if pjτ < p
max
τ
≤ sj if pjτ = p
max
τ
(18)
for all j and mτ . Thus, siτ = ki > si implies that firm i can infer that any rival j with pjτ = p
max
τ
receives sales such that sjτ ≤ sj . Similarly, it can infer that any rival j with pj < p
max
τ , that
receives sales of sjτ = kj , can also infer the same as it.
Next, suppose that firm i sets piτ and that siτ < ki. In this case, firm i can infer that
piτ = p
max
τ , because firm i would supply its full capacity for any mτ otherwise. If siτ ≤ si, then
it can infer from its sales that firm j 6= i’s sales are given by (18). Thus, siτ ≤ si implies that
firm i knows that a rival j with pjτ = p
max
τ also receives sales of sjτ ≤ sj , and it follows from
above that it knows that any rival with a price below pmaxτ can infer this. Finally, if siτ ∈ (si, ki),
then it can infer from its sales that sjτ ∈ (sj , ki) ∀ j.
The above implies that firm i, for all i, can infer that yjτ = y ∀ j, when it receives sales
of siτ ∈ (si, ki). Likewise, it can infer that yjτ = y ∀ j, when it receives sales of siτ /∈ (si, ki).
Thus, given each firm can always observe its sales in each period, it follows that ht is common
knowledge at the beginning of period t, for all t. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Substituting V ciH into (6) and rearranging yields:
δT ≤
πdi − π
c
i − δ[1 −G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
]
(
πdi − π
N
i
)
δ
[
−
(
πci − π
N
i
)
+G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
) (
πdi − π
N
i
)] (19)
For any m < K, it follows from the proportional rationing rule that πci = p
c ki
K m̂ and π
d
i = p
cki,
and all other terms are independent of pc. Thus, the right-hand side of (19) is increasing in
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pc, which implies that collusion is easier to sustain for higher pc. Furthermore, V ciH is strictly
increasing in pc. Consequently, we focus on pc = 1, where (19) simplifies to:
δT ≤
kn −Kδ
(
1−G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
))
δ
[
kn −K
(
1−G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
))] ≡ X (20)
Collusion under imperfect private monitoring is sustainable for a sufficiently large T > 0 if both
the numerator and the denominator of X are negative. This is true if G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
< 1− knK
and if:
δ ≥
1(
1−G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)) πdi − πci
πdi − π
N
i
=
1(
1−G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)) kn
K
≡ δ∗ (k1, kn)
Notice thatG
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
< 1− knK ensures that δ
∗ (k1, kn) < 1. Since
∂G(m∗−1)
∂m = g (m)
∂m∗−1
∂m >
0, it follows that there is a unique level ofm, denotedm′ (k1, kn), that sets G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
= 1−
kn
K < 1, where G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
∈
[
0, 1− knK
)
for all m ∈ [m∗ (k1) ,m
′ (k1, kn)) and m
′ (k1, kn) <
K since G (K) = 1.
Finally, given V ciH is strictly decreasing in T , the optimal length of the punishment phase,
denoted T ∗ (k1, kn), solves maxTV
c
iH subject to δ
T ≤ X , which implies T ∗ (k1, kn) ≡
lnX
lnδ > 0.
Thus, collusion under imperfect private monitoring is sustainable for any T ≥ T ∗ (k1, kn), if
δ ≥ δ∗ (k1, kn) and m ∈ [m
∗ (k1) ,m
′ (k1, kn)). 
Proof of Proposition 4. Differentiating δ∗ (k1, kn) =
1
(1−G(m∗−1(k1,m)))
kn
K with respect to k1 yields:
∂δ∗
∂k1
=
1
K
[
1−G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)] [∂kn
∂k1
+ kn
g
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
1−G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
) ∂m∗−1
∂k1
]
.
Thus, it follows from ∂kn∂k1 ∈ [−1, 0] and
∂m∗−1
∂k1
= −K(K−m)
(K−k1)
2 < 0 that
∂δ∗
∂k1
< 0. The fact that δ∗
falls as kn decreases implies that
∂δ∗
∂kn
> 0.
Differentiating T ∗ (k1, kn) =
lnX
lnδ with respect to k1 yields
∂T∗
∂k1
= 1lnδ
1
X
∂X
∂k1
, where X > 0 is
defined in (20) and:
∂X
∂k1
= −
(1− δ)K
(
1−G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
))
δ
[
kn −K
(
1−G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
))]2
[
∂kn
∂k1
+ kn
g
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
1−G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
) ∂m∗−1
∂k1
]
.
It follows from δ ∈ (0, 1), G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
∈
[
0, 1− knK
)
, ∂kn∂k1 ∈ [−1, 0], g(m) > 0 and
∂m∗−1
∂k1
< 0
that ∂X∂k1 > 0. Together with lnδ < 0 and X > 0, this implies that
∂T∗
∂k1
< 0. The fact that X
rises as kn decreases implies that a fall in kn decreases T
∗, so ∂T
∗
∂kn
> 0.
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Finally, recall that m′ (k1, kn) is the level of m that sets G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
= 1 − knK , so let
Z ≡ 1− knK −G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
= 0. Using the implicit function theorem it follows that:
∂m′
∂k1
= −
∂Z
∂k1
∂Z
∂m
> 0 and
∂m′
∂kn
= −
∂Z
∂kn
∂Z
∂m
< 0
since ∂Z∂m = −g
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
) ∂m∗−1
∂m < 0,
∂Z
∂k1
= − 1K
∂kn
∂k1
− g
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
) ∂m∗−1
∂k1
> 0, and ∂Z∂kn =
− 1K − g
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
) ∂m∗−1
∂k1
∂kn
∂k1
> 0. 
Proof of Proposition 5. It follows from (19) that:
1− δT
∗
=
−(1− δ)
(
πdi − π
c
i
)
δ
[
−
(
πci − π
N
i
)
+G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
) (
πdi − π
N
i
)] .
Substituting the above into V ciH gives:
V ciH =
(
πci −G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
πdi
)
(1− δ)
(
1−G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)) = 1
(1− δ)
ki
K
m̂
(
m̂−G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
K
m̂
(
1−G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
))) ,
where:
p̂c (k1,m) =
m̂−G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
K
m̂
(
1−G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)) .
This implies that p̂c (k1,m
∗ (k1)) = 1, since G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m
∗ (k1))
)
= 0, p̂c (k1,m
′ (k1, kn)) =
p̂N (kn, m̂), since G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m
′ (k1, kn))
)
= 1− knK . Furthermore, p̂
N (kn, m̂) < p̂
c (k1,m) < p
m
for all m ∈ (m∗ (k1) ,m
′ (k1, kn)).
Note that p̂c (k1,m) is a function of k1 and it is independent of the size of the capacity of all
other firms, including kn. Differentiating p̂
c (k1,m) with respect to k1 yields:
∂p̂c
∂k1
= −
(K − m̂) g(m∗−1)
m̂
(
1−G(m∗−1)
)2 ∂m∗−1∂k1 > 0,
since g(m) > 0, 0 < m̂ < m < K and
∂m∗−1
∂k1
< 0. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Substituting in for p̂N (kν , m̂) > p̂
c (k1,m) and rearranging yields:
G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
> 1−
kν
K
.
Recall that m′ (k1, kn) is the level of m that sets G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
= 1− knK and that a necessary
condition for collusion under imperfect private monitoring to be sustainable is G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
∈[
0, 1− knK
)
. Thus, p̂c (k1,m) < p̂
N (kν , m̂) if G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
∈
[
1− kνK , 1−
kn
K
)
, which can only
be true if kν > kn. It follows from
∂G(m∗−1)
∂m = g (m)
∂m∗−1
∂m > 0 that G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
= 1− kνK <
1 − knK for some m < m
′ (k1, kn). Furthermore, by definition m
′ (k1, kν) is the level of m that
sets G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m)
)
= 1− kνK > 0, where m
′ (k1, kν) > m
∗ (k1) since G
(
m∗−1 (k1,m
∗ (k1))
)
= 0.
Thus, p̂c (k1,m) < p̂
N (kν , m̂) if kν > kn and m ∈ [m
′ (k1, kυ) ,m
′ (k1, kn)). 
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